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Absztrakt. 
A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy ellátási lánc esetében. Az 
ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelı ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy Arrow-
Karlin típusú modellben lineáris készletezési és konvex termelési költség mellett. 
Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a fontosabb költségeit. Két mőködési 
rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor elıször a 
termelı, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, 
amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a 
csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevık ebben a transzferálható 
hasznosságú kooperatív játékban. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimális irányítás, Ellátási lánc, Ostorcsapás-hatás, Kooperatív játékelmélet 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
In this paper we apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze supply chains. The 
bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the 
Arrow-Karlin model with linear-convex cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both 
firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the 
manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized 
(cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect 
in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by transferable utility cooperative game 
theory tools. 
 
Keywords: Optimal control, Supply chain, Bullwhip effect, Cooperative game theory 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the supply chain literature so far only non-cooperative game theory concepts were applied, 
see e.g. Kogan and Tapiero (2007) and Sethi at al. (2005). In this paper we analyze supply 
chains by cooperative game theory tools. Our main question is that how the manufacturer and 
the supplier should share the savings they achieve by harmonizing their production plans. We 
apply the following cooperative game theory concepts: the core (Gillies (1959)), the stable set 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)), the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the 
nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) to answer the above question.   
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of cooperating in a supply chain we consider the so 
called bullwhip effect. The bullwhip effect explains the fluctuations of sales (demand), 
manufacturing and supply. The bullwhip effect was first observed by Forrester (1961), later 
Lee et al. (1997) rediscovered this phenomenon. They mentioned four basic causes of the 
bullwhip effect: 
 
- Forrester effect, or lead-times and demand signal processing, 
- Burbidge effect, or order batching, 
- Houlihan effect, or rationing and gaming, 
- promotion effect, or price fluctuations. 
  
These (new) names were introduced by Disney et al. (2003). 
There are two basic models to investigate the decision processes of a firm: the 
Wagner-Whitin and the Arrow-Karlin model. Both models have a stock-flow identity and a 
cost function. The difference between them lies in the cost functions. The well-known lot 
sizing model of Wagner and Whitin (1958) assumes a concave cost function. The second 
basic model applies a convex cost function.  
The basis of this investigation is the well-known Arrow-Karlin type dynamic 
production-inventory model (Arrow and Karlin, 1958). In this model the inventory holding 
cost is a linear function and the production cost is a non-decreasing and convex function of 
the production level. The latest empirical analysis, see Ghali (2003), shows that the convexity 
of the cost function is a reasonable assumption. 
The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate that cooperative game theory tools can 
be applied to supply chain analysis. We consider an Arrow-Karlin-type two-stage supply 
chain and analyse whether the bullwhip effect appears in this model. To show that because of 
the bullwhip effect the cooperation of the manufacturer and the supplier induces savings, we 
develop two models: a decentralized and a centralized Arrow-Karlin-type supply chain model.  
The decentralized model assumes that first the manufacturer solves her production 
planning problem (the market demand is given exogenously) and her ordering process is 
based on the optimal production plan. Then the supplier minimizes her costs on the basis of 
the ordering of the manufacturer. In the centralized model it is assumed that the participants 
of the supply chain cooperate, i.e. they minimize the sum of their costs.  
In the next step we compare the production-inventory strategies and the costs of the 
manufacturer and supplier in the two models to show that the bullwhip effect can be reduced 
by cooperation (centralized model). This cooperation can be defined as a kind of information 
sharing between the parties of the supply chain.  
Finally, we discuss the question of how the manufacturer and the supplier should share 
the savings their cooperation induces. At this point we use concepts of transferable utility 
cooperative games. 
The paper is organized as follows. The decentralized model is discussed in Section 2. 
Section 3 analyzes the centralized (cooperative) supply chain model. In Section 4 we 
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introduce some concepts of cooperative game theory and define supply chain (cooperative) 
games given by the models discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Moreover, we apply the above 
mentioned four solution concepts of transferable utility cooperative games to answer the 
question of how the manufacturer and the supplier should share the savings, the result of their 
cooperation. An exact number example is given in Section 5. The last section briefly 
concludes. 
 
2 The decentralized system 
 
We consider a simple supply chain consisting of two firms: a supplier and a manufacturer. We 
assume that the firms are independent, i.e. each makes her decision to minimize her own 
costs. The firms have two stores: a store for raw materials and a store for end products. 
Moreover, we assume that the input stores are empty, i.e. the firms can order suitable quantity 
and that they can get the ordered quantity. The production processes have a known, constant 
lead time. The material flow of the model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Material flow in the models 
 
 
The following parameters are used in the models: 
 
T  length of the planning horizon, 
D(t)  the rate of demand, it is a continuous and differentiable function, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
hm  the inventory holding coefficient in the manufacturer’s product store, 
hs  the inventory holding coefficient in the supplier’s product store, 
Fm(Pm(t)) the production cost of the manufacturer at time t, it is a non-decreasing and 
strictly convex function, 
Fs(Ps(t)) the production cost of the supplier at time t, it is a non-decreasing and strictly 
convex function. 
 
The decision variables: 
 
)(tIm  the inventory level of the manufactured product, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tI s  the inventory level of the supplied product, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPm  the rate of manufacturing, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPs  the rate of supply, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ . 
 
The decentralized model describes the situation where the supplier and the 
manufacturer optimize independently, we mean the manufacturer determines its optimal 
Im(t) 
Supplier Manufacturer 
Production Production 
Pm(t) Pm(t) Ps(t) Ps(t) Ps(t) 
Is(t) 
D(t) Pm(t) 
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production-inventory strategy first (the market demand is given exogenously), then she orders 
the necessary quantity of products to meet the known demand. Then the supplier accepts the 
order and minimizes her own costs. The cost functions of the supplier and the manufacturer 
consist of two parts: the quadratic production costs and the inventory costs. 
Next, we model the manufacturer in this Arrow-Karlin environment. The manufacturer 
solves the following problem: 
 
( )[ ] min)()(
0
→+⋅= ∫ dttPFtIhJ
T
mmmmm       (1) 
 s.t.   
 
TtIItDtPtI mmmm ≤≤=−= 0,)0(),()()( 0&      (2) 
 
Assume that the optimal production-inventory policy of the manufacturer is ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ dmdm PI  in model (1)-(2) and the manufacturer orders )(⋅dmP . Then the supplier solves the 
following problem: 
 
( )[ ] min)()(
0
→+⋅= ∫ dttPFtIhJ
T
sssss       (3) 
s.t. 
 
TtIItPtPtI ss
d
mss ≤≤=−= 0,)0(),()()( 0&      (4) 
 
Notice that problem (3)-(4) has the same planning horizon [0,T] as that of model (1)-
(2). 
 
To solve problem (1)-(2) we apply the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (see e.g. 
Feichtinger and Hartl, (1986), Seierstad and Sydsaeter, (1987)). The Hamiltonian function of 
this problem is as follows: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ).)()()()()(),(),(),( tStPttPFtIhtttPtIH mmmmmmmmm −⋅++⋅−= ψψ  
 
This problem is an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. To 
obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality we need the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).),(),(),(),(),(),(),( tIttttPtIHttttPtIL mmmmmmmmmmm ⋅+= λψλψ  
 
Lemma 1 ( ))(P),(I dmdm ⋅⋅  is the optimal solution of problem (1)-(2) if and only if there exists 
continuous function )(tmψ  such that for all 0≤ t≤ T 0)( ≠tmψ  and 
 
(a) 
  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )thttI
ttttPtIL
t mmm
m
mm
d
m
d
mm
m λψ∂
λψ∂ψ −=⇒−= && ),(),(),(),( , 
 
(b) 
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( ){ } ( )
( ){ } ( ),)t(PF)t(P)t(t),t(),t(P),t(IHmax
t),t(),t(P),t(IHt),t(),t(P),t(IHmax
d
mm
d
mmmm
d
mm)t(P
m
d
m
d
mmmm
d
mm)t(P
m
m
−⋅=⇒
=
≥
≥
ψψ
ψψ
0
0
 
 
(c) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt mdmm λλ , 
 
(d) ( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅ TTIT mdmm ψψ  
 
 
We do not prove the above lemma, its proof can be found in the above mentioned 
literature. After optimal production strategy )(⋅dmP  is given we can solve problem (3)-(4). 
The Hamiltonian function of problem (3)-(4) is as follows 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ).)()()()()(),(),(),( tPtPttPFtIhtttPtIH dmsssssssss −⋅++⋅−= ψψ  
 
This problem is also an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. 
To get the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality, we need again the Lagrangian 
function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).),(),(),(),(),(),(),( tIttttPtIHttttPtIL sssssssssss ⋅+= λψλψ  
 
The proof of the following lemma can be found again in the mentioned literature. 
 
Lemma 2 ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ dsds PI  is optimal solution of problem (3)-(4) if and only if there exists 
continuous function )(tsψ  such that for all 0≤ t≤ T 0)( ≠tsψ  and 
 
(a) 
  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )thttI
ttttPtIL
t sss
s
ss
d
s
d
ss
s λψ∂
λψ∂ψ −=⇒−= && ),(),(),(),( , 
 
(b) 
  
( ){ } ( )
( ){ } ( ),)t(PF)t(P)t(t),t(),t(P),t(IHmax
t),t(),t(P),t(IHt),t(),t(P),t(IHmax
d
ss
d
ssss
d
ss)t(P
s
d
s
d
ssss
d
ss)t(P
s
s
−⋅=⇒
=
≥
≥
ψψ
ψψ
0
0
 
 
(c) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt sdss λλ , 
 
(d) ( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅ TTIT sdss ψψ  
 
Later we use the following notations: let dmJ  and 
d
sJ  be the optimal values of cost 
functions (1) and (3) respectively, i.e. let 
 
( )[ ]dttPFtIhJ T dmmdmmdm ∫ +⋅=
0
)()(  
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and 
 
( )[ ]dttPFtIhJ T dssdssds ∫ +⋅=
0
)()( . 
 
 
3 The centralized system 
 
In this section we solve the centralized model, i.e. the model, where the manufacturer and 
supplier coordinate their decisions. The model is as follows 
 
 
( ) ( )[ ] min)()()()(
0
→+⋅++⋅= ∫ dttPFtIhtPFtIhJ
T
ssssmmmmms     (5) 
s.t. 
 
TttDtPtI mm ≤≤−= 0),()()(&         (6) 
 
,0),()()( TttPtPtI mss ≤≤−=&         (7) 
 






=





0
0
)0(
)0(
s
m
s
m
I
I
I
I
          (8) 
 
The Hamiltonian function of model (5)-(8) is 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] [ ].)()()()()()()()()()(
))(),(),(),(),(),((
tPtPttStPttPFtIhtPFtIh
tttPtItPtIH
mssmmssssmmmm
smssmm
−⋅+−⋅+−⋅−−⋅−
=
ψψ
ψψ
 
 
The Lagrangian function is 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).),(),(),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(),(),(),(),(
tIttItttttPtItPtIH
ttttttPtItPtIL
ssmmsmssmm
smsmssmm
⋅+⋅+=
=
λλψψ
λλψψ
 
 
The following lemma formalizes the well-known optimality conditions. Its proof can be found 
in the literature mentioned in the previous section. 
 
Lemma 3 ( ))(),(),(),( ⋅⋅⋅⋅ cscscmcm PIPI  is optimal solution of problem (5)-(8) if and only if the 
following points hold  
 
1) ( ) )()()(
),(),(),(),(),(),(),(),(
tth
tI
ttttttPtItPtIL
mmm
m
smsm
c
s
c
s
c
m
c
m ψλλλψψ &−=+−=
∂
∂
, 
 
( ) )()()(
),(),(),(),(),(),(),(),(
tth
tI
ttttttPtItPtIL
sss
s
smsm
c
s
c
s
c
m
c
m ψλλλψψ &−=+−=
∂
∂
, 
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2) ( ){ } ( ) ( ),)()()()(),(),(),(),(),(),(max
0)(
tPFtPttttttPtItPtIH cmm
c
msmsm
c
s
c
sm
c
m
tPm
−⋅−=
≥
ψψψψ  
( ){ } ( ),)()()(),(),(),(),(),(),(max
0)(
tPFtPtttttPtItPtIH css
c
sssms
c
s
c
m
c
m
tPs
−⋅=
≥
ψψψ   
3) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt mcmm λλ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt scss λλ , 
 
4) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅− TTITT mcmsm ψψψ  
( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅ TTIT scss ψψ  
 
The optimal centralized production strategies for the manufacturer and the supplier 
respectively are 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )( )
[ ] ( ) ( )( ) [ ] ( ) ( )( )

>−−
≤−
=
−−
−
,ttFif,ttF
,ttFif,)t(P
smmsmm
smmc
m 0
00
11
1
ψψψψ
ψψ
 
and 
 
[ ] ( )( )
[ ] ( )( ) [ ] ( )( )

>
≤
=
−−
−
.tFif,tF
,tFif,)t(P
smss
smc
s 0
00
11
1
ψψ
ψ
 
 
Finally, consider a notation: let cs
c
m
c
ms JJJ +=  denote the optimal value of cost 
function (5), where 
 
( )[ ]dttPFtIhJ T cmmcmmcm ∫ +⋅=
0
)()(  
 
and 
 
( )[ ]dttPFtIhJ T csscsscs ∫ +⋅=
0
)()( . 
 
4 The cooperative game theoretical solution of the cost sharing 
 
In this section we provide a sharing rule of the savings the cooperation induces. It is easy to 
see the following result: 
 
Lemma 4 ds
d
m
c
s
c
m
c
ms JJJJJ +≤+=≤0 . 
 
This result can be interpreted as follows: The total cost of the decentralized system, i.e. 
the sum of the supplier’s and manufacturer’s costs is higher than that of the centralized 
system. The question is now, how to share the savings induced by the players’ cooperation.  
 First, we introduce the concept of transferable utility cooperative games. Let N= {1, 
2,…, n} be the nonempty, finite set of the players. Moreover, let ℜ→Nv 2:  be a function 
such that 0)Ø( =v , where N2  is for the class of all subsets of N . Then v  is called 
transferable utility (TU) cooperative game, henceforth game with player set N .  
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Game v  can be interpreted as every coalition (subset of N ) has a value. E.g. NS ⊆  
is a coalition consisting of the players of S , and )(Sv  is the value of coalition S . The value 
of a coalition can be the profit the coalition members can achieve if they cooperate, or the cost 
they induce if they harmonize their actions.   
In our model there are two players: the manufacturer ( m ) and the supplier ( s ), i.e. 
},{ smN = , and the value of a coalition is the cost the coalition member induce if they 
coordinate their production plans and inventory strategies.  
 In the decentralized model the players do not harmonize their actions, they achieve 
their minimal costs independently of each other. Therefore (see Subsection 4.1) 
 
d
mJmv =})({   
 
and  
 
s
mJsv =})({ . 
 
In the centralized model the manufacturer and the supplier form a coalition, i.e. they 
cooperate. Therefore (see Subsection 4.2) 
 
c
msJsmv =}),({ . 
 
Henceforth let v  denote the supply chain game defined above. 
 To sum up the above discussion, the decentralized and the centralized model generate 
a (TU cooperative) game. 
To answer the question of how the players should share the savings their cooperation 
induces, we apply four solution concepts of cooperative game theory.  
First, we introduce the concept of core (Gillies (1959)). In our model the core of 
supply chain game v  is defined as follows: 
 
},,:{)( },{ dssdmmcmssmsm JxJxJxxxvC ≤≤=+ℜ∈= , 
 
where xm and xs are coordinates belonging to the manufacturer and the supplier respectively.  
 The core can be described as it consists of allocations of the total cost of the 
centralized model in the way of that none of the players can be better off by leaving the 
centralized model, by stopping cooperation, i.e. the core consists of stable (robust) allocations 
of the costs. It is easy to see that in this model the core is not empty, i.e. there is a stable 
allocation of the costs. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced the concept of stable set. The stable set, 
also called Neumann-Morgenstern solution. In our model the stable set is as follows: 
Let },,:{)( },{ dssdmmcmssmsm JxJxJxxxvI ≤≤=+ℜ∈= , then )(vI  is called the set of 
imputations in supply chain game v . The stable set of supply chain game v , )(vS  is a subset 
of )(vI  such that  
 
- inner stability: for any )(vSx ∈ , there does not exist )(vSy ∈  such that 
smsm xxyy +<+ , 
- outer stability: for all )()( vSvIx −∈  there exists )(vIy ∈  such that 
smsm xxyy +>+ . 
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The two stability conditions say that any element of the stable set cannot be better than 
any other point of the sable set, and for any imputation not in the stable set there exists an 
element of the stable set dominating the given imputation.  
It is easy to see that in this model since )()( vCvI =  and the two stability conditions 
are meaningless, we get the following result: 
 
Lemma 5 Any supply chain game v  has a unique stable set, and )()( vCvS = . 
 
Both the core and the stable set have the disadvantage that those generally consist of 
many points, i.e. those are map-valued solutions. Therefore, the following natural question 
comes up: How can we pick up only one point as a solution? Next we consider two point-
valued solutions. 
Shapley (1953) introduced the following point-valued solution concept: The Shapley 
value of the manufacturer and the supplier respectively in supply chain game v  
 
( )dscmsdmm JJJvSh −+= 2
1
2
1)( , 
 
and 
 
( )dmcmsdss JJJvSh −+= 2
1
2
1)( . 
 
The Shapley value can be interpreted as it is an expected value of the given player’s 
marginal contribution. In other words, e.g. the manufacturer’s Shapley value is the expected 
value with uniform distribution (1/2-1/2) of the manufacturer’s marginal contribution to the 
cost of the two coalitions not containing her, to the empty collation ( dmJ ) and to coalition 
}{s ( dscms JJ − ).  
Next we show that in our model the Shapley solution is in the core and in the stable 
set, hence it is a real refinement of these two map-valued solution concepts. 
 
Lemma 6 For any supply chain game v  ( ) ( )vCvShvSh sm ∈)(,)( . 
Proof.  Take the manufacturer first: Lemma 4 implies that 
d
m
d
m
d
s
c
ms
d
mm JJJJJvSh 2
1
2
1)(
2
1
2
1)( +≤−+= ,  
i.e. dmm JvSh ≤)( . In a similar way we can see that dss JvSh ≤)( .  
Finally, it is well-known that cmssm JvShvSh =+ )()(  (see e.g. Shapley (1953)).        ⁪ 
 
Lemmata 5 and 6 imply that the Shapley solution of supply chain game v  is in the stable set, 
i.e. )())(,)(( vSvShvSh sm ∈ . 
At last, we give the nucleolus of supply chain games. Schmeidler (1969) introduced 
this point-valued solution concept (see Dreissen (1988)). The nucleolus of supply chain game 
v  is 
 
 11 





 −+
=
−+
=
2
)(,
2
)(
d
m
d
s
c
ms
s
d
s
d
m
c
ms
m
JJJ
vNJJJvN . 
 
The nucleolus can be interpreted as it is such an allocation that minimizes the maximal 
exceeds the coalitions can achieve. It is a slight calculation to see that in our model the 
nucleolus and the Shapley value coincide. This, the following lemma is about. 
 
Lemma 7 The nucleolus and the Shapley solution coincide in supply chain games, i.e. for any 
supply chain game v  )()( vShvN = .  
 
Moreover, Lemma 5 implies that the nucleolus of supply chain games is in the stable 
set, i.e. for any supply chain game v )()( vSvN ∈ . It is well known that the nucleolus is 
always in the core, if the core is nonempty; therefore that the core of a supply chain game is 
not empty and Lemma 7 imply Lemma 5.    
 
5 A numerical example 
 
Take the following parameters and cost functions in problems (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(8): 
 
- the initial inventory level of the manufacturer: Im0 = 0.5, 
- the initial inventory level of the supplier:  Is0 = 0.3, 
- the planning horizon:     T = 5 years, 
- the demand rate of the manufacturer:  S(t) = 0.45·t2, 
- the inventory holding cost of the manufacturer: hm = 2, 
- the inventory holding cost of the supplier:  hs = 1, 
- the production cost of the manufacturer:  Fm(Pm(t)) = 0.5⋅ Pm2(t), 
- the production cost of the supplier:   Fs(Ps(t)) = 5⋅ Ps2(t). 
 
In the following we solve the decentralized and the centralized problem. 
 
5.1 The solution of the decentralized problem 
 
The decentralized problem is a hierarchical production planning problem. First the 
manufacturer solves her planning problem then the optimal ordering policy is forwarded to 
the supplier. Finally, the supplier optimizes her own relevant costs based on the known 
ordering policy of the manufacturer. 
The problem of the manufacturer is as follows: 
 
[ ] mindt)t(P.)t(I mm →⋅+⋅∫
5
0
2502  
s.t. 
 
50,5.0)0(,5.0)()( 2 ≤≤=⋅−= tIttPtI mmm&  
 
The optimal solution is 
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


≤≤−⋅
<≤
=
,.tif,.t
,.tif,)t(Pdm 5728045612
728000
 
 
and 
 



≤≤⋅−+⋅−
<≤⋅−
=
..tif,t.tt..
,.tif,t..)t(I dm 572801504561031
7280015050
32
3
 
 
The minimal cost of the manufacturer is 62.078 units. 
In the next step we solve the problem of the supplier, where the manufacturer’s 
ordering policy )(⋅dmP  is given: 
 
[ ] min)(5)(15
0
2 →⋅+⋅∫ dttPtI ss  
s.t. 
 
50,)0(),()()( 0 ≤≤=−= tIItPtPtI ssdmss&  
 
The optimal solution for the supplier is 
 
[ ]5,0,1.0334.0)( ∈⋅+= tttPds  
 
and 
 



≤≤−⋅+−
<≤⋅+
=
..tif,t.t..
,.tif,t..)t(I ds 572809507964230
7280005030
2
3
 
 
 
The minimal cost of the supplier is 342.096 units. 
 
5.2 The solution of the centralized problem 
 
In the following we solve the centralized problem: 
 
[ ] mindt)t(P)t(I)t(P.)t(IT ssmm →⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅∫
0
22 51502  
s.t. 
 
50),()()( ≤≤−= ttStPtI mm&  
 
50),()()( ≤≤−= ttPtPtI mss&  
 






=





3.0
5.0
)0(
)0(
s
m
I
I
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The optimal production rates are the followings: 
 
[ ]5,0,15.1)( ∈+= tttPcm  
 
and 
 
[ ]5,0,2.009.3)( ∈⋅+= tttPcs . 
 
The optimal inventory levels for the manufacturer and the supplier respectively are 
 
 
[ ]5,0,15.05.015.15.0)( 32 ∈⋅−⋅+⋅+= tttttI cm  
 
and 
 
[ ]5,0,4.094.13.0)( 2 ∈⋅−⋅+= ttttI cs . 
 
The minimal cost of the centralized system is 400.425 units, where the manufacturer’s cost is 
67.056 units and the supplier’s cost is 333.369 units. 
 
5.3 Comparison of the solutions of the decentralized and the centralized system 
 
First, compare the production rate and inventory level of the manufacturer and the supplier in 
the cases of the decentralized and the centralized system, where Imd(t), Imc(t), Isd(t) and 
Isc(t) are for the inventory level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized 
and the centralized model respectively. 
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Figure 2 The inventory level of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
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Figure 3 The inventory level of the supplier in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
 
In this example the inventory level of the manufacturer decreases in the case of cooperation, 
i.e. in the centralized system. The inventory level of the supplier increases when the 
participants cooperate in the supply chain, see Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 4 The production rate of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
 
As we see, the production level in the centralized system is smoother, i.e. the growth of the 
production rate is smaller than that in the case of the decentralized system, and the contrary is 
true for the supplier, i.e. in the decentralized system the production rate of the supplier is 
smoother than that in the centralized system, where Pmd(t), Pmc(t), Psd(t) and Psc(t) are for 
the production level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized models respectively, and S(t) is for the exogenously given demand, see Figures 4 
and 5. This phenomenon is the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized model. 
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Figure 5 The production rate of manufacturer in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
 
The optimal costs of the decentralized and the centralized problem are presented in Table 1. 
 
 Decentralized 
problem 
Centralized 
Problem 
Manufacturer costs 62.078 67.056 
Supplier costs 342.069 333.369 
Total costs 404.148 400.425 
 
Table 1 The optimal costs 
 
As we have seen, the total cost of the centralized problem is lower than that of the 
decentralized one. The cost reduction is approximately 1%. In the centralized problem the 
manufacturer cost increases with more than 8% and the supplier cost decreases with 2.5%. 
After the above analysis the question of how to share the savings, the cooperation of 
the participants in the supply chain induces, comes up. 
 
5.4 Cost sharing 
 
The Shapley value of the manufacturer and the supplier (it coincides with the 
nucleolus and is in the core and in the stable set) are 217.60)( =vShm  and 208.340)( =vShs  
respectively. It means that the players share their savings equally. 
It is important to see that since in the case of cooperation 67.056=cmJ  and 
333.369=csJ  a transfer is needed to get the Shapley value: the supplier must transfer 6.839 
units to the manufacturer. It means that the manufacturer and the supplier agree on a contract 
such that the parties commit themselves to cooperate and the supplier commits herself to pay 
6.839 units to the manufacturer. 
 
6. Conclusion and further research 
 
In this paper we have solved two two-stage supply chain models: a decentralized and a 
centralized model. We have showed that the cooperation of the two players induces savings in 
costs. 
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 In the next step we have considered sharing rules for the savings. We have applied 
cooperative game theory solution concepts to this problem, and we have introduced the 
concept of supply chain games. It was shown that in supply chain games the core and the 
stable set coincide, so do the Shapley value and the nucleolus; therefore the Shapley value is 
always in the core.   
 As an illustration for our results we have presented an exact number example. In this 
example the supplier’s cost of adaption in production to the fluctuations in the orderings of 
the manufacturer is higher than that of the manufacturer. Moreover, the production costs are 
dominant over the inventory costs. Therefore it is not surprising at all that in the centralized 
model the supplier has reduced her inventory level, and the manufacturer’s inventory level is 
higher than that in the decentralized model, and vice versa for the supplier.  
The reason of this fact is that the manufacturer minimizes her relevant cost in the 
decentralized model, so that her production level is near to the demand rate. After cooperation 
the manufacturer gives up to follow her cost optimal production strategy to allow the supplier 
to reduce her own production-inventory cost implying a decrease in the total cost of the 
supply chain as well, since the supplier’s cost saving balances out the increase of the 
manufacturer’s cost.  
This phenomenon points at the well known bullwhip effect of supply chains in a way: 
the supplier decreased the inventory level after information sharing (cooperation), and she 
adjusted her production rate closer to the demand rate. 
In this type supply chains the two players might have asymmetrical roles. It can 
happen that the manufacturer has much stronger bargaining position than that of the supplier 
or vice versa. Since this asymmetry in the bargaining powers is exogenously given, it is not 
reflected by the proposed solution, by the Shapley value. The future research can propose 
solutions concepts which can reflect the exogenously given bargaining powers. 
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